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Abstract: In a receQWDUWLFOH0DUN&RO\YDQKDVFULWLFL]HG-HUUROG.DW]¶V
attempt to show that Quinean holism is self-refuting. Katz argued that a 
Quinean epistemology incorporating a principle of the universal 
revisability of beliefs would have to hold that that and other principles of 
WKH V\VWHP ZHUH ERWK UHYLVDEOH DQG XQUHYLVDEOH &RO\YDQ UHMHFWV .DW]¶V
argument for failing to take into account the logic of belief revision. But  
granting the terms of debate laid down by Colyvan, the universal 
revisability principle still commits Quineans to holding that one belief is 
both revisable and unrevisable: the belief that some beliefs are revisable. 
 
7KHROGµSDUDGR[¶ 
 
Quine (1980; 1960) popularized a radical holism, which held that all beliefs are in 
principle revisable in the face of experience. Quinean holism contains a principle of the 
universal revisability of beliefs (UR). It it tempting to employ the same diagonalisation 
strategy that is held to have refuted logical positivism in an attempt to refute holism: for 
UR is itself revisable, according to UR. There is something initially implausible about 
that. The argument which Quine gives for holism does not itself appeal to experience. 
So it would appear that if we know that Quinean holism is true, we must know it a 
priori. Quineans could respond, however, that since they hold that logic itself is 
revisable, no philosophical argument establishes its conclusion indefeasibly. So the 
argument for holism does depend on experience, and so Quineans are not committed to 
their knowing a priori that holism is true. 
 
Katz (1998, pp. 72-74) has argued that UR does create a paradox. His idea is that any 
epistemological system which has UR as one of its principles must take those principles 
as both revisable and unrevisable. Katz sees Quine¶VHSLVWHPRORJLFDOV\VWHPDVKDYLQJ
three principles, of which UR is one and the other two are a principle of non-
contradiction (N) and a principle of simplicity (S). The revisability of the principles is 
an obvious consequence of UR itself; why must they DOVR EH XQUHYLVDEOH" .DW]¶V
thought is that any belief revision is a consequence of accepting an argument which has 
the epistemic principles as premises. So any argument for the revision of a principle has 
that principle as a premiss. Thus the argument is unsound: its conclusion contradicts one 
of its premises, and so it cannot have premises and a conclusion which are all true. But 
if there can be no sound argument for the revision of one of the principles of a system, 
then those principles are not revisable (or so Katz maintains). 
 
:KLOVW .DW]¶V DUJXPHQW LV IDVFLQDWLQJ , DJUHH ZLWK &RO\YDQ  WKDW KH KDV QRW
pinpointed a paradox, and so not refuted holism. But he does point in the direction of a 
genuine paradox for holism. In the remainder of this first section I will explain what is 
Daniel Y. Elstein A new revisability paradox 2/8 
ZURQJZLWK .DW]¶VDUJXPHQW7KHVHFRQGVHFWLRQZLOO LQWURGXFHP\ QHZSDUDGR[DQG
VKRZ KRZ LW HVFDSHV &RO\YDQ¶V REMHFWLRQV WR WKH ROG SDUDGR[ 7KH WKLUG VHFWLRQ
considers the impact of the new paradox on holism. I will suggest that the new paradox 
forces holism to be restricted in a way that may undermine much of its motivation. 
 
:HFRXOGFKDOOHQJH.DW]¶VDUJXPHQWLQYDULRXVSODFHV)LUVWFRQVLGHUKLVUHDVRQLQJ IRU
the unsoundness of any argument for revising one of the principles. We might admit that 
the most basic form of reasoning for the revision of one of the principles involves taking 
that principle as a premise, but hold that this reasoning can be augmented as follows so 
as to eliminate the occurrence of the principle as an undischarged assumption. We start 
ZLWKDQDUJXPHQWRIWKHIRUP3«ş¤3ZKHUH3LVWKHUHOHYDQWSULQFLSOH%XWZHFDQ
convert this into a proof of ¬P from the other premises (not including P) by introducing 
P as a supposition, deducing ¬P within the scope of that supposition using the earlier 
argument, and then discharging the supposition and obtaining ¬P by ¬-introduction. A 
VLPLODU SRLQW LV GLVFXVVHG E\ &RO\YDQ  S 1RZ WKLV PDQHXYHU ZRQ¶W DOZD\V
work, because it relies on non-contradiction and a bit more of classical logic besides. So 
LWGRHVQ¶WEORFN.DW]¶VDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW WKHUHEHLQJD VRXQGDUJXPHQW IRUUHYLVLQJ1
though it does seem to show that his reasoning does not apply to revising UR. This 
GRHVQ¶WLQLWVHOIUHVROYHWKHSDUDGR[VLQFHLW¶VHQRXJKIRU.DW]WKDWDV\VWHPFRQWDLQLQJ
both N and UR as principles is paradoxical. 
 
Suppose we grant Katz that there cannot be a sound argument for revising N for the 
foregoing reasons. Does that mean that N cannot be revised? One way of avoiding 
.DW]¶V FRQFOXVLRQ PHQWLRQHG E\ 5HVQLN DQG 2UODQGL  S  ZRXOG EH WR VD\
that what we are looking for is an argument against believing N, not an argument for 
1¶VIDOVLW\6XSSRVHWKDW1LVWUXHWKHQWKHUHLVQ¶WDQ\WKLQJWRVWRSDQDUJXPHQWZith N 
as one of its premises and the advisability of not believing N as its conclusion from 
EHLQJVRXQG7KLVLVXQFRQYLQFLQJKRZHYHUVLQFHWKHUHFDQ¶WEHJRRGepistemic reasons 
IRUGLVEHOLHYLQJVRPHWKLQJZKLFKDUHQ¶WUHDVRQVIRUWKLQNLQJLWIDOVHRUOHss likely to be 
true). 
 
A better objection to Katz is to note that in a framework where logical principles are up 
for grabs we have to be careful about what we use as our background logic. In 
SDUWLFXODUWKHUHLVUHDVRQWRGRXEW.DW]¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHway to discover whether a 
principle is revisable is to find out whether there is a sound argument for its revision. 
:KHQ &RO\YDQ  S  FRQVLGHUV WKLV TXHVWLRQ KH SRLQWV RXW WKDW µ,I WKHUH LV QR
IRUPDOQRWLRQRI ORJLFDOFRQVHTXHQFHDWDOO WKHQ.DW]¶s argument simply fails, because 
KLV DUJXPHQW FOHDUO\ UHTXLUHV VRPH QRWLRQ RI ORJLFDO FRQVHTXHQFH¶ :KDW &RO\YDQ
suggests is that we use some non-monotonic, belief-revision logic. But he goes on to 
explain why this does not help Katz: 
 
>6@XSSRVHZH¶UHRSHUating in some belief-revision logic. Then the truth or falsity of N is beside the point. 
:KDW¶VLPSRUWDQWLVZKHWKHU1LVUDWLRQDOO\GHIHQVLEOH1RZOHW¶VVXSSRVHWKDWDWWLPHt1, prior to making 
inference (1) [the inference from the prior belief set and principles to ¬N], N was rationally defensible, 
but at some later time t2DIWHUPDNLQJWKHLQIHUHQFH1ZDVQRWUDWLRQDOO\GHIHQVLEOH.DW]¶VFKDOOHQJH
I take it, is to provide a rational defense of ¬N at time t2. (2006, pp. 5-6) 
 
And as CRO\YDQVD\VWKLVWDVNLVQ¶WWRRKDUGEHFDXVHafter revising we have a belief set 
and epistemological principles which include ¬N (that was the revision!), so trivially 
there is an argument from our belief set and principles to ¬N. 
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&RO\YDQ¶VDUJXPHQWVHHms correct as far as it goes, but there is a further point we need 
to consider. We have an answer to the question of how we can take ourselves to be 
justified in believing ¬N after the revision. But how do we take the revision itself to 
have been justified? The idea must be that the original argument for ¬N showed that the 
pre-revision principles were problematic ± they included a rule against contradictions 
but had a consequence relation which allowed for the derivation of a contradiction ± 
whereas the post-revision principles have no such problem. So we are now in a better 
epistemic situation than we were in before. It would be foolish to expect that in such a 
case there would be any explicit argument for the revision which we could endorse both 
before and after, because the revision involved a change in the consequence relation 
(insofar as we are considering only monotonic logics). As Resnik and Orlandi suggest 
(2003, p. 305), what would be a problem is if the revised principles prohibited the 
revision we had just made. But they do not: there is no reason to think that ¬N prohibits 
revision of N, or that ¬UR prohibits revision of UR. 
 
.DW]¶V DUJXPHQW IDLOV EHFDXVH WKHUH LV QR SODXVLEOH WHVW RI WKH UHYLVLRQ RI RQH RI WKH
principles that finds anything wrong with that revision. The revision is putatively 
legitimate because the ex ante position was unstable, the ex post position is stable (in 
that there is a trivial argument for the revised belief), and the revision is not prohibited 
either before or after it hDV WDNHQ SODFH 3HUKDSV VRPH UHSO\ LV DYDLODEOH WR .DW]¶V
defenders, but rather than consider that issue in more detail, I will show how the 
arguments used against Katz point the way to a more plausible paradox. 
 
2. The new paradox 
 
We now have something like a recipe for paradox. Find a belief with the following 
property: revising that belief leads to a new belief set which prohibits that revision. The 
most obvious candidate is an existential revisability claim (ER) that some beliefs are in 
principle revisable in the face of experience. Consider what happens when ER is 
revised: the resulting belief set contains ¬ER, and thus prohibits all revisions. But then 
from the post-revision point of view one cannot take the revision to have been justified. 
And of course it is known in advance that any revision to ER will be without an ex post 
justification. 
 
According to the Quinean, who holds UR, and thus holds ER to be revisable, experience 
could give us reason to believe that experience never gives us any reason to believe 
anything. Or alternatively: some experience could make it a reasonable option for me to 
start believing that no experience could ever make it a reasonable option for me to 
change my beliefs. But this is obviously impossible. Only by manifest self-deception 
could I come to think that some experience gave me reason to believe that no 
experience could ever give me reason to believe anything which I did not already 
believe. Such a thought is self-undermining. By reductio then, ER is unrevisable. But 
UR entails that ER is revisable, so the combination of UR and ER is paradoxical, and 
clearly UR is the one that has to go. 
 
1RWH WKDW WKH QHZ SDUDGR[ LV VLPSOHU WKDQ .DW]¶V LQ VHYHUDO UHVSHFWV ,W UHOLHV RQ QR
distinction between principles and other beliefs: it is enough that a belief set contain 
both UR and ER for it to be paradoxical, regardless of whether either is a principle. The 
argument does not require any fixed consequence relation; rather it can be seen as 
relying on a form of reflective equilibrium which holds that changes in belief must be 
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endorsable after they have occurred. 
 
The dialectical situation is that Colyvan (2006, p. 5) has presented Katz with with a 
dilemma: the argument against Quine must be conducted using either a non-monotonic 
belief-revision logic, or an informal reflective equilibrium framework. The latter is no 
help to Katz, so Colyvan concessively concentrates on the former. And he goes on to 
IUDPH .DW]¶V FKDOOHQJH DV WKH GHPDQG IRU D UDWLRQDO GHIHQVH RI WKH QHJDWLRQ RI WKH
allegedly unrevisable principle post-revision. Colyvan claims to have met this challenge 
by pointing out that a trivial argument can be given from any belief to itself. But with 
the new paradox in view, it is Colyvan who has to face the dilemma. It would not be a 
concession to my argument to assume that there is a fixed consequence relation and that 
the reflective equilibrium approach can be ignored. I am not in reflective equilibrium if 
I believe that my last change of belief was mistaken, because in such a situation I will 
backtrack to my previous doxastic state.1 Unless Colyvan has a different understanding 
of what reflective equilibrium involves, it is now a concession to him to assume that a 
belief-revision logic will provide a way of settling the dispute. And there is some reason 
to think that the belief-UHYLVLRQ ORJLFDSSURDFKFDQ¶WEHEHVW:KHQZHDUHFRQVLGHULQJ
whether to believe ¬ER, it seems inappropriate to take any belief-revision logic as fixed, 
since any belief set including ¬ER is committed to a particular (highly non-standard) 
belief-revision logic, according to which all belief-revisions are incorrect. 
 
Even if we do concede to Colyvan that a belief-revision logic is appropriate, that still 
leaves us with the question of whether belief in ¬ER can be justified post-revision. Now 
there is presumably some connection between revisability and justification; that is what 
LV LQYROYHG LQ 85 EHLQJ D SULQFLSOH RI 4XLQH¶V HSLVWHPRORJ\ 3UHVXPDEO\ WKLV
connection amounts to the possibility of defining revisability in terms of justification: a 
belief is revisable in the face of experience iff some experience could in principle justify 
revising that belief. But then ¬ER says that no experience could in principle justify the 
revision of any belief. So in particular according to ¬ER a revision which brought about 
EHOLHI LQ ¤(5 FDQQRW KDYH EHHQ MXVWLILHG 5HFDOO WKDW &RO\YDQ¶V VXJJHVWLRQ ZDV WKDW
since we can always argue from a belief back to itself, a trivial justification of any belief 
will be available from a belief set containing it. Can there really be such circular 
justification? Colyvan suggests in a footnote why he thinks there can: 
 
[T]he circularity is simply the circularity of proving an axiom from itself or justifying an axiom by its 
consequences. This may be the best we can do when asked to provide justification for fundamental 
principles or axioms. (2006: 9 n14) 
 
This is unobjectionable as far as it goes: we have to start our epistemic enterprise from 
somewhere, and it is reasonable to hold that we are justified in continuing to believe 
what we started out believing, so the original beliefs must have a circular default 
MXVWLILFDWLRQ%XW¤(5LVQ¶WDQD[LRPRUDQRULJLQDORUIXQGDPHQWDOEHOLHIDWOHDVWLQWKH
case I describe. It is something that one has come to believe, and it is easy to see post-
revision that coming to believe it involved a mistake. A good epistemology may well 
allow that original beliefs have a default justification stemming simply from the fact 
that we start off believing them, but it will not allow clear mistakes to become 
entrenched; this forces us to acknowledge a distinction between beliefs for which a 
circular justification is acceptable and those for which it is not. In a belief revision logic, 
a circular justification should not be acceptable for beliefs arrived at via revision: it is 
hard to defend as rational a belief that was formed by a process now taken to be 
irrational when the only thing counting in favour of maintenance of that belief is the 
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belief itself. It appears then that a Colyvan-style defense of the revisability of ER would 
fail even on its own terms.2 
 
Colyvan (2006, p. 8) compares revising UR to democratically voting for a dictatorship: 
unwise but not paradoxical. Whilst it is worrying if holists take traditional empiricism to 
be like a dictatorship, the analogy is apt for the new paradox in that an epistemology 
including ¬ER really would be autocratic. But revising ER is still not quite like voting 
for a dictatorship; it is like taking such a democratic vote to (alone) legitimate 
dictatorship. That is paradoxical, because if democracy is what confers legitimacy on 
government, a dictatorship (which does not allow for democratic government) cannot be 
legitimate, and if democracy does not confer legitimacy then a fortiori it cannot confer it 
on a dictatorship. 
 
3.  Holism and normativity 
 
7DNLQJP\VHOIWRKDYHLPSURYHGRQ.DW]¶VREMHFWLRQWRKROLVP,QRZZDQWWRFRQVLGHU
the wider picture of how all this fits in with other objections to holism, and what 
resources the holist might have in response. Once it is acknowledged that a truly 
universal revisability principle is untenable, the natural weakening of holism is to 
restrict the scope of UR.3 There is an independent line of argument against including 
logic within the scope of UR: Wright (1986) claims that classical logic (or at least the 
principle of non-contradiction) appears to be required in order to make sense of 
UHFDOFLWUDQFH 5HFDOO WKDW 4XLQH¶V SRVLWLRQ LV WKDW ZKHQ IDFHG ZLWK D UHFDOFLWUDQW
experience we may adjust our beliefs in various ways, which is meant to show that no 
experiment can test a particular belief rather than the whole web of beliefs. This 
position takes it for granted that there is such a thing as a determinately recalcitrant 
experience. But if we are allowed to revise our logic, it seems that we can make any 
total theory compatible with any possible experiences by holding that there is no 
problem if the total theory predicts one experience and we have another. In other words, 
including logic in holism makes it possible in any case to avoid revision to the theory 
VLPSO\E\GHQ\LQJWKDWRQH¶VH[SHULHQFH LVUHFDOFLWUDQW$QGWKLVFROODSVHVHPSLULFLVP
since there is no longer a genuine distinction between experiences which are 
incompatible with oQH¶V WRWDO WKHRU\ DQG WKRVH ZKLFK DUH QRW4 Whether or not this 
argument succeeds in showing that UR should not range over logical principles, the new 
paradox creates trouble even for a suitably restricted version of holism, since ER is not 
plausibly a logical truth. 
 
Any restriction on UR sufficient to exclude ER will presumably have to exclude itself 
too, since UR and ER are beliefs of the same kind (the only difference between them is 
a change of quantifier). So a form of holism immune to the new paradox will also be 
XQWRXFKHG E\ WKH ROG SDUDGR[ 6LQFH VRPH UHVSRQVHV WR .DW]¶V SDUDGR[ DUH PRUH
FRQFHVVLYH WKDQ&RO\YDQ¶VD UHVWULFWLRQ WR85KDVDOUHDG\ EHHQVXJJHVWHGDQG LWZLOO
work as a way of avoiding the new paradox too. The idea of the restriction is that UR 
and ER are both normative claims.5 This suggests a simple principle which excludes 
them: 
(UR*) All non-normative beliefs are revisable in the face of experience. 
Whilst UR* does the job of providing a non-paradoxical form of holism, I think that 
Quineans would be unwise to rest easy with such a solution. If they can utilise the 
normative/non-normative distinction to avoid trouble, so can their opponents. 
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For Quine the rival of his holism, and target of his attacks, was a more moderate 
empiricism which allowed for a priori, unrevisable knowledge by way of analytic truth. 
$NH\SODQNRIWKHDUJXPHQWIRUKROLVPLVWKXV4XLQH¶VFUXFLDOREMHFWLRQWRDQDO\WLFLW\
WKDW µDQDO\WLF¶ FDQQRW EH VDWLVIDFWRULO\ GHILQHG   %XW ZKDt if we say that 
µDQDO\WLF¶ LVDQRUPDWLYHWHUP",W LVSODXVLEOHWKDWFODLPVRIDQDO\WLFLW\DUHQRUPDWLYH
because they conflict with UR*, which is itself normative, and presumably anything 
contradicting a normative claim is normative.) Suppose that the primary meaning of 
µ³$OO YL[HQVDUH IHPDOH´ LVDQDO\WLF¶ LV WRH[SUHVVDFRPPLWPHQWWRQHYHU UHYLVLQJ WKH
EHOLHI WKDW µ$OO YL[HQV DUH IHPDOH¶ LV WUXH ,I WKLV ZHUH ULJKW WKHQ WKHUH ZRXOG EH QR
SUREOHP ZLWK XQGHUVWDQGLQJ KRZ WKH PHDQLQJ RI µDQDO\WLF-for-/¶ Ls derived from the 
PHDQLQJRIµDQDO\WLF¶UDWKHUWKDQYLFH-versa, as Quine suggests). 
 
So can we hold that there are analytic truths just in case there are (non-normative) 
VHQWHQFHV OLNH µ$OO YL[HQV DUH IHPDOH¶ ZKLFK ZH DUH FRPPLWWHG WR QHYHU UHYLVLQJ"6 
Those who challenge the link between analyticity and revisability (and thus the link 
between semantic and epistemological holism) would deny it. We could admit that there 
are analytic truths whilst still leaving open the possibility that we are wrong about what 
those truths are. And my suggested defense of analyticity seems to get this wrong: if I 
rule out the possibility of revising, then I ignore the possibility of error, and I also 
ignore the possibility that we could have a simpler (and so better) total theory by 
revising. To see why this criticism is mistaken we have to distinguish between revising 
RQH¶V EHOLHI DQG UHYLVLQJ RQH¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR QRW UHYLVLQJ WKDW EHOLHI 2Q P\ YLHZ
VD\LQJ WKDW µ$OO YL[HQV DUH IHPDOH¶ LV DQDO\WLF UXOHV RXW UHYLVLQJ RQH¶s belief that all 
YL[HQVDUH IHPDOHEXW LWGRHVQRWUXOHRXW UHYLVLQJRQH¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRQRW UHYLVLQJ
ZKLFKLVWRVD\WKDWLWGRHVQRWUXOHRXWUHYLVLQJWKHEHOLHIWKDWµ$OOYL[HQVDUHIHPDOH¶LV
analytic. I am saying that claims of analyticity commit one to not revising the belief that 
is claimed to be analytic, not to not revising the claim of analyticity itself. 
 
An opponent might say that this distinction collapses, because to be committed to the 
revisability of the claim that a belief is unrevisable just is to be committed to the 
revisability of that belief. To see that this is an error, consider the commitment to the 
universal moral wrongness of lying, and suppose that someone has that commitment, 
but takes it to be revisable (perhaps because she recognizes her own fallibility in moral 
argument). If the collapse objection were correct then she would be inconsistent, 
because taking her commitment to be revisable would involve not being committed to 
not lying in all circumstances. Since she is clearly not inconsistent, there is no collapse. 
Perhaps it seems that the analogy cannot be a good one, precisely because it appears 
that there is collapse in the analyticity case and not in the lying case.7 My thought is that 
we can use the analogy to explain what is involved in a claim of analyticity. The claim 
that lying is necessarily wrong commits one to holding that an act is wrong simply in 
virtue of being an instance of lying, and thus to disregarding any other factors which 
might count against such acts being wrong. But this does not preclude reconsideration 
of the principle that lying is always wrong in light of surprising cases of lying which 
may arise. Following the norm means holding certain judgements (whether particular 
acts of lying are wrong) to be independent of a certain kind of evidence (the other 
properties of those acts); but holding the norm does not require one to hold that the 
other properties of acts of lying are irrelevant to the correctness of the norm itself. When 
I hold that it is analytic that vixens are female, I commit myself to holding true (inter 
DOLDWKHVHQWHQFHµ$OOYL[HQVDUHIHPDOH¶UHJDUGOHVVRIWKHHPSLULFDOGDWDEXWWKDWGRHV
not require me to think that the empirical data is irrelevant to whether it is correct to 
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accept such a norm. 
 
$QRWKHU ZD\ RI VHHLQJ WKLV SRLQW LV WR QRWH WKDW LQ FRPLQJ WR WKLQN WKDW µ7KHRULJLQDO
PHWUHEDULQ3DULV LVRQHPHWUHORQJ¶LVQRWDQDO\WLFLHUHYLVLQJWKHFRPPLWPHQW,GR
QRWDXWRPDWLFDOO\FRPHWRWKLQNWKDWµ7KHRULJLQDOPHWUHEDULQ3DULVLVRQHPHWUHORQJ¶
is not true (revising the belief). There has to be a difference because one sometimes 
encounters people who think that it is analytic that the original metre bar is one metre 
ORQJEXWZKHQFRUUHFWLQJWKHPRQHGRHVQ¶WZDQWWKHPWREHlieve that it LVQ¶W one metre 
long. If there is a difference between revising the belief that p and revising the belief 
that q, then there is plausibly also a difference between taking p to be revisable and 
taking q to be revisable. 
 
One plausible response for the holist at this point is that whilst the above account of 
analyticity may be tenable, it breaks the link between analyticity and revisability. Even 
LI,KROGWKDWµ$OOYL[HQVDUHIHPDOH¶LVDQDO\WLFDQG,DPWKXVFRPPLWWHGWRQRWUHYLVLQJ
it, I may still revise my belief that all vixens are female by first revising that 
commitment. So it seems that analytic truths turn out to be revisable, and thus that it is 
not after all crucial to holism (or at least epistemological holism) to reject analyticity. 
This way of looking at things founders, however, once we contrast judgements of 
analyticity with UR* itself. If the judgement that a non-normative sentence is analytic 
LQYROYHV D FRPPLWPHQW WR QRW UHYLVLQJ RQH¶V DVVHQW WR WKDW VHQWHQFH WKHQ LW PXVW EH
incompatible with the judgement that all non-normative beliefs are revisable. For 
ZKDWHYHU SUHFLVHO\ µUHYLVDEOH¶ PHDQV KHUH KROGLQJ WKDW D EHOLHI LV UHYLVDEOH VXUHO\
requires not being committed to not revising it.8 ,I KROGLQJ WKDW µ9L[HQVDUH IHPDOH¶ LV
analytic is inconsistent with accepting UR* (and indeed any similar principle), then 
holism does seem to have to provide arguments against analyticity.9 
 
,I 4XLQH¶V DUJXPHQW DJDLQVW DQDO\WLFLW\ QRZ DSSHDUV ZHDN LQ WKH OLJKW RI D VWURQJ
normative/non-normative distinction, then a holism involving UR* is not a stable 
refuge. For some analytic truths would be non-normative, and thus would be 
counterexamples to UR*. And without an argument against analyticity it is unclear why 
the holist is so insistent that all non-normative beliefs are unrevisable, since she now 
admits that some beliefs  (like ER) are revisable. This is not to deny that there are better 
formulations of holism than UR* (my reason for focussing on UR* is simply that it is 
proposed in the literature).10 But it is worth bearing in mind that it is not much use 
having a consistent revisability principle if it undermines the motivation for holism, and 
that is the problem with UR*. Will other attempts do better? 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
.DW]¶VDWWHPSWWRSURGXFHa paradox by diagonalisation on UR fails, as Colyvan shows. 
But there is a paradox of self-reference lurking. Quineans must admit that ER is not 
UHYLVDEOH QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ &RO\YDQ¶V SRLQWV DERXW WKH PHWKRGRORJ\ RI VXFK GLVSXWHV
They are thus committed to a restriction of UR that goes beyond excluding logical laws 
from its scope; for ER is not a logical law. The obvious restriction is to exclude 
normative beliefs. But if a normative/non-normative distinction can help Quine out, it 
can also undercut his argument against analyticity, and thus a Quinean argument for 
UR*. Katz was on to something: holists need to watch out for revisability paradoxes.11 
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1
 I do not mean that whenever I notice that I have made a mistake in reasoning I must abandon the 
belief formed on the basis of the bad reasoning; perhaps there is some independent justification for that 
belief which I noticed only after adopting it. But the test of whether this justification is genuinely 
independent is whether it was in principle available even before the belief was adopted. Insofar as beliefs 
FDQSURYLGHMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKHPVHOYHVJLYHQ&RO\YDQ¶VSRLQWWKDWWKHUHLVDYDOLGDUJXPHQWIURPDEHOLHI
to itself, this justification will obviously not pass that test of independence, and so will not help to 
maintain equilibrium in the case given in the text. 
2
 ,WPD\VHHPIURPP\DUJXPHQWKHUHWKDW,VKRXOGVLPSO\HQGRUVH.DW]¶VRULJLQDODUJXPHQWDJDLQVW
&RO\YDQ¶V REMHFWLRQ%XWWKHUHDUHVWLOOWZRUHDVRQVIRUGRXEWLQJ.DW]¶VDUJXPHQWDQGSUHIHUULQJWKHQHZ
paradox. One is that given a belief-UHYLVLRQ ORJLF LW LVQ¶W FOHDU WKDW WKH UHYLVLRQ RI 1 WR ¤1 FDQ¶W EH
MXVWLILHGVLQFHDSSO\LQJ5HVQLNDQG2UODQGL¶VFULWHULRn) there is nothing in ¬N to prohibit revision of N. 
This contrasts with the case of the revision of ER. The second point is that, as I have argued above, a 
reflective equilibrium approach is at least as plausible as a belief-revision logic as a way of adjudicating 
the question of whether UR produces a paradox, and the new paradox works much better than the old in 
the former framework. 
3
 Or to achieve the same result by restricting the domain of quantification so that not all beliefs are 
within it, or by RSHUDWLQJZLWKDUHVWULFWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµEHOLHI¶ 
4
 $KPHGVXJJHVWVDUHVSRQVHWRDQDUJXPHQWOLNH:ULJKW¶V$OWKRXJKLWLVDOZD\VLQVRPHVHQVH
possible for the holist to revise logic so as to render any experience non-recalcitrant, this will not always 
be a real option. In other words, the holist can take a rule of inference to be up for grabs sometimes, but 
not always, and thus avoid collapsing empiricism. This position is delicate because it relies on there being 
some rule for determining when it is an option to revise a rule of inference. Suppose that faced with an 
apparently recalcitrant experience this second-RUGHUUXOHPDNHVLWQRWDQRSWLRQWRUHYLVHRQH¶VILUVW-order 
UXOHV RI LQIHUHQFH VR WKDW WKH H[SHULHQFH LVQRW UHFDOFLWUDQW:K\ FDQ¶t we revise the second-order rule 
itself, so that it is then an option to revise the first-order rule which makes the experience recalcitrant? 
Presumably because there is a third-order rule which makes it not an option to revise the second-order 
rule in those circumstances. But we are now threatened with an infinite regress of rules, which would 
involve an implausible infinitist account of our grasp of logical rules. Hope of avoiding this regress 
perhaps lies in rules which apply to themselves. 
5
 Both ResniNDQG2UODQGL DQG$GOHU VXJJHVW LQUHVSRQVH WR.DW]¶VDOOHJHGSDUDGR[
using the normative/non-normative distinction to restrict UR. 
6
 As argued above, ER is unrevisable, but it may not seem to be analytic. If it is not, then the definition 
RIµDQDO\WLF¶JLYHQLQWKHWH[WZRXOGKDYHWREHPRGLILHGEXW,WKLQNWKHEDVLFSRLQWZRXOGVXUYLYH 
7
 This objection was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
8
 What this reveals is that if we model the revisability of a belief in modal logic as the accessibility of 
a web of beliefs not containing that belief from the present web, then the relevant accessibility relation is 
not transitive. I suspect that the incorrect intuition (that the suggested view of analyticity collapses) rests 
on an assumption that the accessibility relation must be transitive. 
9
 As I was reminded by an anonymous referee, Quine (1960) does accept a limited class of analytic 
truths: the one-criterion word ones. But the strategy I have outlined could I think be used to explicate all 
claims of analyticity. 
10
 An anonymous referee suggests that the various restricted versions of UR expressible whilst doing 
without an unrestricted truth predicate will likely be immune to revisability paradoxes. 
11
 I am grateful to Arif Ahmed, David Liggins, Florian Steinberger, Tim Storer and two anonymous 
referees for help with this paper, and to an audience at the 2006 Joint Session of the Mind Association and 
the Aristotelian Society, where I presented an earlier version. 
